Abstract-In distributed reflective denial-of-service (DRDoS) attacks, adversaries send requests to public servers (e.g., open recursive DNS resolvers) and spoof the IP address of a victim. These servers, in turn, flood the victim with valid responses and -unknowingly -exhaust its bandwidth. Recently, attackers launched DRDoS attacks with hundreds of Gb/s bandwidth of this kind. While the attack technique is well-known for a few protocols such as DNS, it is unclear if further protocols are vulnerable to similar or worse attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, an attacker with financial, political or purely destructive motivation disrupts a service of a victim by adding an excessively high load to the victim's service(s). There are several forms of DoS attacks [30, 18] , most of which are well-documented and used by attackers to disturb services for years. For example, attackers target victims with distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks and instruct infected PCs that are part of a malicious botnets [4] . Similarly, attackers can exhaust application-layer resources, such as the maximum number of database sessions of a web application [30] .
In distributed reflective denial-of-service (DRDoS) attacks, an adversary aims to exhaust the victim's bandwidth. He abuses the fact that public servers of UDP-based network protocols respond to requests without further validating the identity (i.e., the IP address) of the sender. DRDoS offers many desired attack features for an adversary: (i) He disguises his identity, as victims receive backscatter traffic from amplifiers, i.e., systems that can be abused to send traffic to the victim on the attacker's behalf; (ii) The simultaneous abuse of multiple amplifiers permits a highly-distributed DoS attack to be conducted from a single Internet uplink. (iii) The traffic reflected to the victim is significantly larger in bandwidth than the traffic an attacker has to send to the amplifiers.
Adversaries abused the high potential of massive DRDoS attacks recently. In May 2012, attackers targeted a real-time financial exchange platform with a 167 Gb/s DRDoS attack [15] . In March 2013, attackers launched 300 Gb/s DRDoS attack against Spamhaus.org [16] . In August 2013, presumably politically-motivated attackers brought down GreenNet, an ISP hosting human rights groups, with a 100 Gb/s DRDoS attack [36] . In these known examples, attackers abused open DNS resolvers to amplify their attack traffic. The attacker(s) issued specially-crafted ANY requests to thousands of open resolvers and specified the victim's IP address as packet source. In turn, after successful name resolution, the resolvers sent several-kilobyte-large responses to the victim, exceeding its bandwidth capacity. With these attacks, DNS has been practically proven to be vulnerable to DRDoS abuse. One of the reasons for this vulnerability are the recent deployment of EDNS0 and DNSSEC, which significantly increases the DNS response sizes [5] . As a consequence, developers and administrators increasingly harden DNS servers against abuse, e.g., by closing millions of open resolvers and limiting the request rate per client [38] . However, DNS is not the only widely-deployed service, and little is known about angles for amplification of other popular network protocols.
In this paper, we revisit UDP-based network protocols and evaluate if they are vulnerable to amplification attacks. We identify and describe amplification vectors in 14 protocols of various services, including network services (such as NTP, SNMP, SSDP and NetBios), legacy services (CharGen and QOTD), peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing networks (BitTorrent and Kad), game servers (Quake 3 and Steam) and P2P-based botnets. Many of these protocols have been designed decades ago way before DRDoS attacks emerged. As we show, attackers can abuse these protocols to multiply their attack bandwidth by factors from 3.8 (BitTorrent, NetBios) up to 4670 (NTP). In combination with source IP address spoofing, this adds severe loads to designated DRDoS victims. For each protocol, we explore the set of potential amplifiers, for example, by scanning the Internet for open services, by crawling P2P networks, or by requesting game server lists from master servers. We show that millions of potential amplifiers are available for six vulnerable protocols -ideal for attackers that aim to distribute attacks over many traffic sources.
We then use a three-fold approach to understand if attackers abuse these vulnerable protocols. (i) We deploy bait services for these protocols and monitor how they are abused by attackers. (ii) We analyze if attackers scan for potential amplifiers by looking at the scanning noise of two darknets. (iii) We propose a light-weight method to detect DRDoS attacks via traffic analysis and deploy it at a large ISP. Our evaluation of more than 130 real-world DRDoS attacks shows that DNS is still the most popular DRDoS protocol, but we also already witnessed attacks abusing CharGen, SNMP and Quake 3.
Fearing that adversaries will soon discover other powerful amplification vectors like NTP or SSDP, we describe and evaluate countermeasures. We show that for some of the protocols, existing attack detection techniques, such as port-, content-or length-based filtering approaches will fail, as none of these attributes is characteristic in the attack traffic. In addition, we show that request rate limiting does not sufficiently protect against carefully-crafted DRDoS attacks that abuse millions of amplifiers. To foster security of future protocols and their implementations, we also discuss how protocols can be hardened and give positive examples that are presumably immune to DRDoS attacks.
The following list summarizes our contributions: 1) We discover that 14 network protocols can be abused to launch DRDoS attacks that amplify the attack traffic by the order of up to three magnitudes. We found thousands, and for six protocols even millions of amplifiers, allowing for highly distributed attacks.
2) We propose methods to detect real-world DRDoS attacks, such as bait services that are monitored for abuse and using traffic analysis to identify DRDoS victims and amplifiers. We analyze more than 130 real-world attacks, showing that DRDoS attacks bother network operators on a daily basis.
3) We describe and evaluate DRDoS countermeasures and discuss methods (not) to use to harden network protocols and vulnerable implementations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we describe our threat model. In Section III, we show popular network protocols that are vulnerable to amplification. We search for real-world attacks abusing these protocols in Section IV. We evaluate countermeasues in Section V, discuss our findings and future work in Section VII and conclude our work in Section VIII.
II. THREAT MODEL
Our threat model are distributed and reflective denial-ofservice (DRDoS) attacks, in which an attacker A aims to consume all available bandwidth of a victim V . Reflective means that A does not directly send traffic to V , but instead uses systems that reflect the attack traffic to V (so called amplifiers). Distributed accounts for the fact that A abuses thousands of amplifiers and V thus faces thousands of attack sources. The victim V is any Internet-connected host (i.e., server or client) with a single uplink, usually (but not necessarily) identified by a single IPv4 address.
A controls an Internet gateway that can send IP packets with spoofed source addresses. This assumption is reasonable despite the fact that IP spoofing is considered a bad habit and is discouraged [21] . As of July 2013, the Spoofer Project listed that 25% of the Autonomous Systems world-wide allow IP spoofing [1] . Our threat model becomes more severe the higher the bandwidth available to A, but we do not make assumptions about the bandwidth an attacker can use.
A further knows at least one UDP-based protocol P for which he can craft requests that a server (a potential amplifier) for P will answer. We assume that A can obtain a set of amplifiers (M P ) that respond to valid requests of protocol P . As we will show, obtaining M P is typically not a high burden to attackers, as attackers can easily understand most network protocols by reading public documentation or open source code. In this work, we focus on protocols for which the responses are larger than the requests. Attacks become worse the higher this imbalance is, as A can then actually amplify (and not only reflect) its traffic.
We further restrict A such that he cannot control or configure the amplifiers in any way, i.e., he can only use services offered to anybody. To be specific, for the P2P botnets we analyze, A can not command the bots. Figure 1 illustrates our threat model. A sends small requests to three heterogeneous amplifiers that all run services that are vulnerable to an amplification attack. A specifies V 's IP address as source for the request sent to M P , causing the amplifiers to send their responses to V -although V never asked for it. In case of amplification vulnerabilities in P , M P typically sends responses which are significantly larger than the requests, causing bandwidth congestion at V .
Other types of DDoS attacks are outside the scope of this work, such as exhausting TCP connections or slowing down application-layer services. Note that we focus on IPv4 only, but our results should be similar in IPv6 networks.
To summarize, our threat model represents a typical setting of underground DDoS services. In fact, the most severe DRDoS attacks so far followed exactly this setting [16, 15, 36] . In this work, we seek to understand if we can expect similar or even worse attacks in the future.
III. AMPLIFICATION VULNERABILITIES
In DRDoS attacks, two main factors determine the impact of an attack. First, attackers strive to abuse network protocols that not only reflect traffic, but that also amplify the attack bandwidth. Second, the number of amplifiers and their aggregated attack bandwidth constrains the bandwidth of an DRDoS attack. In this section, we show which popular network protocols are attractive to attackers in this regard.
A. Protocol Overview
One of the key characteristics of DRDoS attacks is that attackers abuse network protocols in which i) small requests lead to relatively large responses and ii) where reflection of traffic with spoofed IP source addresses is possible due to the lack of a proper handshake. As such, we exclude all TCPbased protocols from our analysis, as IP address spoofing is restricted to the start of the TCP handshake. Although the TCP handshake fulfils the reflection criterion, it does not allow for easy amplification (since a TCP ACK is not larger than a TCP SYN packet). However, we show that 14 popular UDP-based network protocols are suitable candidates for DRDoS attacks. Table I categorizes the 14 protocols that we analyzed into five groups. The first group consists of popular protocols used for network services, such as time synchronization, host discovery or device monitoring. We added two legacy protocols, Character Generation (CharGen, RFC 864) and Quote of the Day (QOTD, RFC 865), to the second group. The third group comprises two protocols of P2P-based file sharing networks. In group four, we added two game server engines that are used for various game implementations. In the last group, we explore how P2P-based botnets [26] can be abused for DRDoS attacks, i.e., even for somebody not being the botmaster. This nonexhaustive list represents the protocols that we found are most relevant for our analysis. We excluded a few protocols from our analysis for which we did not find amplification vectors, such as the ECHO and ISAKMP protocols -these protocols do, however, allow non-amplified traffic reflection attacks.
B. Amplifier Enumeration
In this section, we enumerate the amplifiers per protocol, i.e., the set of public hosts that may be abused for amplification attacks. In case of DNS, dedicated projects already track the number of open resolvers that could be used to launch DRDoS attacks using DNS. However, for the majority of the other protocols, the number of potential amplifiers is unknown. The more amplifiers are available, the harder it becomes to identify or alert attack sources and the higher is the maximum attack bandwidth. We use three techniques to enumerate the amplifiers for the 14 analyzed protocols: scanning, crawling and querying master servers.
For network services, we assume that they run on their standardized UDP port and we scan the Internet for available amplifiers. To save resources and limit the noise of our scans, we scan a random sample of 10 6 IP addresses out of the set of all 2.6 billion advertized IPv4 addresses. We then extrapolate the total number of amplifiers from the number of amplifiers found during our partial scan. In our experiments, we used a synchronous 150 MBit/s Internet connection for scanning, and each scan finished in 65 seconds on average. Implementing an optimized and complete scanner is out of the scope of this work. As shown by Durumeric et al. [8] , an attacker could speed up this process and complete a /0 IPv4 scan for one protocol in less than two hours by using a 1 Gb/s uplink and a more efficient scanner implementation. Similarly, Dainotti et al. observed botnets that complete /0 stealthy scans [6] . This shows that, in practice, scanning is no burden to attackers.
In the case of P2P protocols (both malicious and benign networks), we enumerate the amplifiers by an iterative search through peer list exchanges, a process often referred to as crawling. Crawling requires detailed knowledge about the P2P protocols and message structures. If available, we studied the source code of popular protocol implementations (e.g., eMule for Kad or libtorrent for BitTorrent), or manually reverse engineered protocol implementations otherwise (e.g., for the P2P-based bots). We obtained an initial set of ten bootstrapping peers from public resources or the protocol implementations. We then iteratively query the set of known peers to retrieve their neighboring peers. Such peer list exchanges are an inherent protocol feature of all P2P networks. Note that crawling typically only identifies Internet-facing peers, which is exactly the set of amplifiers we are interested in. That is, we include only peers that at least once responded to our requests, by which we exclude all peers behind a firewall or NAT gateway.
In order to cope with the effects of IP address churn, we terminated the crawling process after one hour. For a detailed description of our crawler implementation we refer to our crawling scheme described in our work on measuring the size of P2P-based botnets [26] . Given that we terminated our crawls after one our, we hypothesize that our P2P crawling results represent lower bounds for the actual number of amplifiers. This would follow our detailed analysis of P2P botnet crawls [26] . We confirmed this hypothesis by observing that our crawler was still learning new peers (identified by previously unseen identifiers, if available) when terminating the process.
Lastly, for the game server protocols, we leverage the fact that game servers register at a master server, which we query to obtain a list of available game servers. Although typical, registration at the master server is not mandatory, i.e., the number of actual game servers is probably slightly higher than the set of servers obtained from the master server. We validated the retrieved server lists by cross-checking them with the set of servers displayed in-game and with online game server browsers. We also included game servers that are passwordprotected, as password protection in this case is irrelevant for the scenario that we will describe.
In the specific case of DNS, we measure two types of amplifiers. First, we scan the Internet for open resolvers, i.e., public resolvers that serve recursive name lookups to any client. Again, as this is not important for our threat model, we also include resolvers that returned incorrect resource records [27] . Second, we give lower bounds for the number of authoritative name servers. We cannot scan for authoritative name servers, though, as we do not know the zones a server is authoritative for. However, an attacker can crawl the Internet (e.g., web sites) for domains and then determine the authoritative name servers for these domains. Instead of crawling ourselves, we use the public dataset of the Common Crawl project 1 . We then recursively resolve each domain name and track all authoritative name servers.
We performed the measurements during weekdays between 1pm and 3pm GMT. Table II shows our results per protocol. We rounded the numbers for the scanning measurements to indicate that accuracy is lost by extrapolating the scanning results. While open DNS resolvers rank highest, also SSDP, NTP, NetBios, SNMP and BitTorrent reveal millions of potential amplifiers. Of the 255,819 authoritative DNS name servers, we found that at least 1404 deploy DNSSEC. The two legacy protocols, CharGen and QOTD, offer significantly fewer amplifiers. For the P2P networks, we ignore all peers that cannot be abused as amplifiers, e.g., because they are behind a NAT gateway or firewalled, and crawled for an hour only. The numbers are thus a subset of all peers in a network, which also explains the difference to previous measurements on P2P botnet sizes [26] . Still, the P2P networks span thousands, and BitTorrent even millions of potential amplifiers.
Lastly, we measured how long it takes for an attacker to obtain 1000 and 100,000 amplifiers per protocol, respectively. For scanning, we assume that a /0 scan for a UDP-based protocol finishes in two hours [8] and calculate the time to find a subset of amplifiers accordingly. For the P2P networks we measure when -relative to the time when starting a crawl -a peer responds to us the first time. or SSDP. Only for protocols with fewer amplifiers, such as QOTD or CharGen, even finding a small subset of amplifiers takes several minutes. Moreover, for DNS NS , crawling the web for domains (a step we omitted) and recursively resolving the domains takes hours. However, overall, this shows that attackers can assemble a set of recent amplifiers as a preparation for a DRDoS attack in no time.
C. Amplification Factors
In this section, we evaluate the potential amplification factors of the 14 protocols in Table I . In a first step, we analyzed each of the protocols to find potential vectors of amplification. For the network service protocols, we studied the respective RFC documents and popular open source implementations. We dissected the two P2P file sharing protocols by examining several open source client implementations, such as eMule, libtorrent or Vuze. For the game servers, we found possible attack vectors in the public API documentation provided by the game vendors. Lastly, we reverse-engineered the network protocols of the three bot binaries to understand the encryption schemes and different request types of the proprietary P2P protocols.
As a measure for amplification, we define the bandwidth amplification factor (BAF) as the bandwidth multiplier in terms of number of UDP payload bytes that an amplifier sends to answer a request, compared to the number of UDP payload bytes of the request, i.e.: BAF = len(UDP payload) amplifier to victim len(UDP payload) attacker to amplifier
We chose not to include Ethernet, IP, or UDP headers in this calculation so that our measurements remain valid even if the upper protocol layers change in the future, such as during the migration from IPv4 to IPv6.
In addition, we measure the packet amplification factor (PAF) as the packet multiplier in terms of number of IP packets that an amplifier sends to answer a request. More formally, we define the PAF as: For each protocol, we aim to identify the request-response scenario with the highest bandwidth amplification factor. We then send the corresponding request to all amplifiers that we identify in Section III-B and measure the average response size. While the BAF mainly depends on the protocol, it also depends on the specific amplifier instance and its protocol implementation. In fact, an attacker can first measure the BAF per amplifier and -in the actual attack -use only the subset of amplifiers with the highest BAFs. We thus also included two further BAF measures that show the BAF if the attacker focuses on abusing the most severe 50% or 10% of the amplifiers, respectively. Table III summarizes our results.
The PAF in Table III shows the PAF that we measured when using all (and not a subset of) amplifiers.
In the following, we will describe the maximum amplification scenarios and our measurement results per protocol: 1) SNMP v2: We found that SNMP v2 2 supports the GetBulk operation, in which a device returns a list of SNMP identifiers that can be monitored. In the legitimate use case, this request can be used to iterate all monitoring values. An attacker can abuse this feature to amplify traffic by factor 6.3. The exact response size is determined by the number and length of identifiers in the returned item list. If an attacker abuses only the 10% subset of the amplifiers that reply with the largest payload, the BAF increases to 11.3.
2) NTP:
We found that NTP servers support the monlist request, which most NTP server implementations accept in its short form of only 8 bytes. Upon receiving a monlist request, an NTP server shares its recent clients in up to 100 UDP datagrams with 440 bytes payload each. One response datagram specifies statistics for NTP clients (such as the client's IP address, its NTP version and the number of requests) who contacted this NTP server -a useful debugging feature in the legitimate use case. The total response length depends on the number client statistics a server shares upon request. On average, monlist requests amplify the request traffic by factor 556.9-4670.0, the highest BAF in our measurements.
Next to monlist, NTP servers support further features 2 We focus on SNMP in version 2 as it is the most popular version and supported by the majority of SNMP devices.
that may be abused for attacks with significantly lower amplification rates. Preliminary research results show that these features do, however, still show severe amplification rates and are supported by a larger set of servers. As of writing this, we are still investigating the dimensions of and appropriate countermeasures against these problems with NTP server developers and CERTs. We leave a complete analysis of these further NTP features open to future work.
3) DNS: Name lookups (e.g., A or MX records), the traditional use-case of DNS, have low amplification rates. Traditionally, the size of UDP replies was limited to 512 bytes and DNS switched to TCP communication for larger replies. However, many DNS servers adopted the DNS extensions (EDNS0) that allow for UDP responses of up to 4096 bytes. Attackers may abuse ANY request with EDNS0, for which a server returns all known DNS record types for a given domain.
We distinguish between two different attacks abusing DNS for amplification. First, in our setting DNS OR , an attacker abuses open resolvers as amplifiers. Attackers can enforce high amplification rates by resolving ANY requests from domains that result in large responses. In fact, an attacker could even configure a domain he controls such that its authoritative name server responds with exactly 4096-byte-wide responses. As these responses will be cached by the resolvers (i.e., the amplifiers) according to the TTL, the attacker's domain would face only little load. Depending on the queried domain name length and the maximum EDNS0 size a resolver supports, this amplifies the UDP payload by factor 28.7-64.1.
Network operators have become aware of this kind of abuse and the number of open DNS resolvers is gradually decreasing. However, there is an increasing number of authoritative name servers that include larger resource records in their responses. One of the reasons is the deployment of DNSSEC [5] , in which each resource record is accompanied with a typically 1024-bit-wide signature in a special RRSIG record. In a second attack setting, DNS NS , we thus measure the amplification rate when an attacker sends ANY requests to authoritative name servers only. We compute the amplification factors without the requirement to configure a specialized attack domain. In our experiment, we send ANY requests to the authoritative name servers found in our crawl and filter on the 1404 name servers that deploy DNSSEC for at least one domain. We then observed a BAF of 54.6, which can be even as high as 98.3 for the top 10% of authoritative name servers.
Intuitively, one would expect that the amplification rate for open resolvers is higher than for authoritative name servers, as the attacker can (as we did) control and maximize the contents of the response to an ANY request. However, the reason why the BAF is lower for DNS OR than in DNS NS is that many open resolvers did not support EDNS0 and thus chopped the responses to 512 bytes. We did not observe such a behavior for most of the authoritative name servers.
4) NetBios:
In NetBios, we achieve the highest amplification using a name lookup, for which a receiving Windows system responds with its current network and host name configuration. We observed an average BAF of 3.8. The response sizes are influenced by the host names and network setups of the amplifiers. When focusing on the top 10% of amplifiers the BAF is 4.9.
5) SSDP:
Upon SSDP discovery requests, UPnPenabled hosts respond with one reply packet per "service" they have configured. On average, we achieved a BAF of 30.8. The response size depends on the configured services and the length of the service name ("USN"). Some of the amplifiers responded with a few reply packets only, as they offer fewer services. An attacker could thus achieve a higher BAF of 75.9 when using the top-10%-amplifiers only. 6) CharGen: According to RFC 864, CharGen servers reply with random characters to incoming UDP datagrams of any length. We therefore chose to send requests of a single byte (a technique we will later also observe to be used by attackers). On average, we received 358.8 bytes from the CharGen servers, whereas the statistical mode of the response sizes was 74 bytes and a few servers replied with up to 1472 bytes. We chose not to calculate BAFs on subsets of the servers due to lack of statistical significance for the relatively small set of 34 amplifiers in our dataset 3 .
7) QOTD:
Similar to CharGen, also Quote of the Day servers (RFC 865) send replies to UDP datagrams of any length. The average response size (i.e., quote length) was 140.3. Again, we do not calculate the BAF for amplifier subsets due to missing statistical significance.
8) BitTorrent:
In BitTorrent, we identified that hash searches -which are primarily used to find peers that serve a specific file -may result in large responses. While normal peers only return a list of neighboring peers, BitTorrent trackers also include two 256-byte-wide bloom filter arrays with BitTorrent swarm information in their reply 4 . As not all peers know and share this information, the BAF varies among amplifiers. In our experiment, we tried to maximize the number of tracker replies by searching for the most prominent 100 file hashes 5 . While the average BAF is 3.8 only, an attacker can achieve a BAF of 10.3 by abusing the top 10% of the amplifiers (typically BitTorrent trackers).
9) Kad:
We use a peer list exchange message to gain a BAF between 16.3 and 22.7 in Kad. Upon a 35-byte-wide peer list request, a Kademlia client shares up to 31 peers, which consist of an ID (16 byte), IP address (4 byte) and UDP port (2 byte) plus Kademlia message header and meta data. The number of peers shared depends on the client implementation and varied between 15 and 31 peers in our crawl. The amplification is higher compared to BitTorrent due to the smaller requests.
10) Quake 3:
For the Quake 3 game servers we found the highest amplification when asking a server for its current status, a 15-byte-wide request. The reply is significantly larger and includes, e.g., the detailed server configuration and a list of current players. The average BAF was 63.9, but was as high as 82.8 for the top-10% servers with many active players and complex server configurations.
11) Steam:
The Steam game protocol is used by a large number of games such as Counter-Strike, Half-Life or Team Fortress. Again, we can leverage the status information request to flood a potential victim with server status replies, with similar implications as for Quake 3. The average BAF of 5.5 is lower than for Quake 3, as the status replies do not contain the list of active players, the requests are larger (25 bytes) and the server status replies are dense. When focusing on the top-10%, we achieved a BAF of 14.7.
12) ZeroAccess:
The ZeroAccess P2P botnet in version 2 (ZAv2) 6 supports three message types in its P2P communication, of which the peer list and command exchange is most effective in terms of amplification. For a request of only 16 bytes, a ZAv2 bot returns 16 neighbors (8 bytes each) and information about the currently active malicious modules, including a 128-byte-wide RSA signature by the botmaster. This results in BAFs of 36.0-41.1. Usually bots are synchronized regarding the commands, i.e., we observed only a low amplification derivation between all responses. 13) Sality: Similar to ZeroAccess, also the Sality P2P bot offers three message types as part of its command-andcontrol communication. Sality is a malware downloader and bots can thus exchange URL lists of files that bots should install on the infected PC, including a 256-byte-wide RSA signature. We measured a BAF of 37.3-38.4. Again, most bots are synchronized regarding the current URL lists, so there is only little gain in choosing amplifier subsets.
14)Gameover:
In the Gameover P2P bot, a banking trojan, we leverage the peer list and proxy list exchange mechanism to achieve highest amplification. For a 52-byte-wide UDP payload, Gameover bots first reply with a list of up to ten neighboring peers [2] . In addition, bots send four additional datagrams with a list of proxies that can be used to upload data, such as stolen online banking credentials. The average number of packets is even larger: Gameover peers may issue counterrequests to amplification victims, an artifact that increases the packet amplification above 5. In total, Gameover offers a relatively constant BAF of 46.
IV. REAL-WORLD OBSERVATIONS
The amplification potential identified in the previous section is attractive to attackers who follow our threat model. In this section, we analyze to what extent such attacks can be observed in the wild. First, using Netflow data from a large ISP, we search for DRDoS attack victims and for amplifiers that are abused during DRDoS attacks. Second, we search for UDP port scans in darknet traffic, which may indicate that attackers try to spy on amplifiers. Third, we publish and monitor amplification baits which are attractive to be abused in amplification attacks.
A. Dataset Descriptions 1) Netflow data: We obtained Netflow data from a large European ISP comprising about 1 million end users (consumer and business). The ISP hosts multiple servers that are vulnerable to amplification attacks. We manually confirmed the presence of open DNS resolvers, authoritative name servers, various game servers, NTP servers, SNMP-and SSDP-enabled hosts, four CharGen servers, dozens of clients infected with P2P-bots and plenty of P2P file sharing users. The ISP blocks IP spoofing for egress packets, but we can still use the dataset to detect incoming DRDoS attacks and abuses of amplifiers within the ISP's network(s).
The dataset spans from July 14th to July 25th 2013 (12 days). Due to the high load on the routers, the ISP sampled Netflow data and configured the routers to randomly choose 1/100th of all packets for Netflow recording. Luckily, due to the aggressive nature of DDoS attacks, such a sampling does not interfere with our goals to detect the attacks. We filter the Netflow data on the UDP ports of the protocols with a fixed server port (see Table I on page 3) to ease analysis. We will thus miss a few protocols in favor of a higher data processing performance.
2) Darknet traffic: Darknets are unused IP address ranges, i.e., networks in which no services or users are hosted and that should thus not be used in legitimate cases. Any traffic directed to the darknet can be considered as background Internet traffic, such as backscatter or scans. Darknets are thus a suitable setting to identify scanning activity [3, 40, 6] . We have access to two darknets with different granularity. Darknet D1 spans a /17 network and is monitored using Netflow. Darknet D2 spans a disjoint /27 network and we record the full network traces to allow packet inspection. We use four weeks of traffic from June/July 2013 in both darknets for further analysis.
3) Amplifier baits: Third, we published bait services on the Internet that are vulnerable to amplification abuse. We tried to make these baits public and attractive to attackers. For example, we hosted game servers for Quake 3 and Steam, registered them at the Master server and added bots (non-human players) to increase the amplification factor for these servers. We started a public NTP server and listed it in public NTP pools. In addition, we spawned file sharing clients for BitTorrent (uTorrent) and Kad (eMule) and let them download and seed popular files. We also have access to a real authoritative name servers that hosts a DNSSECenabled domain with Google's PageRank popularity of five. We implemented and launched CharGen and QOTD services. Finally, we infected each a separate Windows VM with one of the malicious P2P-based bots and limited the network connectivity to the P2P communication, mitigating all potential threats by the bot such as spam or clickfraud. We exposed these services end-June 7 and have been operating them for four consecutive weeks before analyzing the data.
We operate the baits on public IPv4 addresses to prevent side-effects from firewalls or NAT gateways. This may raise ethical concerns, as we publish services that can be abused for DDoS attacks, i.e., our baits may participate in real attacks. To mitigate this harm, we strictly monitored these systems and throttled the maximum uplink bandwidth for each of the services to 1 MBit/s. In addition, when we saw that an attack started, we immediately blocked the outgoing traffic on a per-IP address basis. This way, even if the bait services are abused for amplification attacks, the attack impact is limited and represents less bandwidth than a typical amplifier would have. Admittedly, though, we could not entirely avoid participating in actual attacks. We hope, however, that the insights that we got compensate the potential harm of our experiments.
B. Real-world Amplification Scans
We first aim to identify UDP-based scanning activities that may indicate attackers who search for amplifiers. As we have shown in Section III, amplifiers for most protocols can be found by horizontally scanning the Internet for open services. With horizontally we mean that attackers choose one service that they want to abuse and then scan (a subset of) the IP address space for potential amplifiers for this service. Such Internet-wide scans can be identified using darknets [6, 40, 3] . We leverage our two darknet datasets, D1 and D2, to inspect what services are prominent to be scanned by potential attackers. We obtain a concise overview by aggregating the packets received in our darknets per UDP port. Detecting TCPbased scanning activity is unrelated to bandwidth amplification attacks and is therefore outside the scope of this work. Table IV summarizes the traffic statistics for the top-10 most prominent UDP ports in darknet D1. We will mainly use D2 to manually inspect the scans, but for completeness, we also list the numbers of D2 in the table. Table IV shows four protocols that we identified as vulnerable to amplification attacks: DNS, CharGen, NetBios and SNMP. We use the network traces recorded at D2 to manually inspect the traffic for these protocols. For CharGen, all hosts sent one byte UDP payload to scan for servers, in all cases except one the value 0x01. This may indicate that the code used for scanning for CharGen servers is shared among attackers. Similarly, all the NetBios scans used equal name queries, except that the transaction ID was always randomized and the broadcast flag was set in a few casespossibly an artifact of the Conficker worm [22] . For SNMP, we saw that scanners searched both, for SNMP v1 hosts (63%) and SNMP v2 hosts (37%), using a mixture of bulk-and nonbulk requests all in the "public" community 8 . NTP and SSDP were not present in the top-20 list of D1. We also did not find NTP monlist requests in D2, showing (yet) little interest by attackers in these protocols.
The darknets reveal also scans for protocols other than the ones we discuss in this paper. For example, most prominent, attackers scan for SIP-enabled devices (UDP port 5060/5061). However, the high number of average bytes per packet (>400) suggests that these scans are not related to amplification attacks. Likewise, the scans for MSSQL servers rather indicate other scanning motivations, e.g., identifying devices vulnerable to exploitation. The low packet sizes for scans for Teredo tunnels and two unknown services (ports 4614/39455) may suggest attackers search for devices vulnerable for amplification attacks. However, manual payload inspection did not reveal the intention of these scans.
C. Real-world DRDoS Victims
In this section, we aim to detect DRDoS victims in an ISP's network. We follow the intuition that DRDoS victims will receive large amounts of traffic from amplifiers, while they have never requested data from the amplifiers. Figure 2 shows a typical amplification attack scenario. In this example, three amplifiers (black nodes) are abused by an attacker to relay large amounts of traffic to the victim. Due to IP address spoofing, the attacker remains invisible to the victim. However, from the victim's perspective, the amplifiers can be detected by correlating the in-and outgoing traffic per client. For example, while amplifier M 2 sends traffic with an average bandwidth of 3 MB/s, V never sent any requests to M 2 . In the normal case, such as for legitimate hosts a and b, we observe a more balanced ratio between in-and outgoing traffic. Note that a high bandwidth towards a host alone is not only characteristic for DRDoS attacks. In Figure 2 , nodes V and a may, e.g., transfer large files using UDP, causing high transfer rates.
We leverage these observations to detect victims of amplification attacks using the Netflow dataset. For each client/server pair, we extract a few network characteristics by aggregating Netflow data. In this context, a server runs a specific service that is vulnerable to amplification attacks, thus the servers represent the set of potential amplifiers. We restrict our analysis on network protocols that use a fixed UDP port and we can thus identify servers by their (IP address, UDP port) tuple. For example, to find DNS servers, we search for hosts that send UDP packets with source port 53. 9 A client is any host, identified only by its IP address (ignoring client ports), communicating with a server. We consider all clients as potential DRDoS victims. In the rare case if both hosts of a flow communicate on server ports, we treat the hosts both as client and as server.
We then create a pairflow for each client/server pair and aggregate a few light-weight communication features:
pairf low := < C IP , S IP , S port , B 2s , B 2c , t > A client/server pair is identified by the client IP address (C IP ), the server IP address (S IP ) and the server's UDP port (S port ). We generate multiple pairs per client/server if a server runs multiple services. For each pairflow, we then extract the number of UDP payload bytes (i.e., in accordance with our definition of BAF in Section III) per communication direction, whereas B 2s is the number of bytes from the client to the server and B 2c vice versa. We focus only on UDP traffic and ignore other protocols like TCP or ICMP. Lastly, we compute the pairflow duration t, defined as the interval between the first and the last packet of the client/server pair. We can use t to compute average bandwidths of pairflows.
We compute the pairflows for each hour in our Netflow dataset. That means, for the 12 days of our measurement, we compute pairflows for 288 hours separately. This allows us to speed up computation and decrease the latency between the attack and attack detection. We then apply a heuristic to find clients that are potential DRDoS victims in that we i) filter on pairflows exceeding a traffic threshold and ii) filter on clients that received significantly more traffic than they sent to the server. For i), we discard all pairflows f where f.B 2c < T B and we set T B = 100, 000 bytes in our evaluation. We use this optional pre-processing filter to speed up the process of matching client and server pairs. Setting lower traffic volume thresholds also helps to discard backscatter or scanning-related packets [19, 3] . In addition, discarding less prominent flows helps to cope with packet sampling, as bi-directional flows with a few packets may turn into uni-directional flows in sampled Netflow data. Finally, we also discard all pairflows with servers that are within the network of the ISP, as we do not consider threats from within the network.
For ii), for all remaining pairflows, we compute a ratio between sent and received bytes, i.e., r f = f.B2s f.B2c . If a client never sends requests to the server, i.e. B 2s = 0, we set r f = 1. Most pairflows between the amplifiers and the victim during a DRDoS attack have r = 1, as it is unlikely that the victim requests data from the amplifiers 10 . We mark pairflows as suspicious if the BAF exceeds a threshold T r , i.e., if r f > T r . In our evaluation, we chose a conservative setting of T r = 1000, i.e., raise suspicion for all servers (potential amplifiers) that send more than 1000x traffic volume to the client (potential victim) than they received from it.
Results: Table V lists the 15 DRDoS attacks against subscribers of the ISP that our analysis on the Netflow dataset revealed. All times listed in the table are GMT. We assigned a unique label (A-I) to the victims and hide IP addresses for privacy reasons. As expected, the majority of the attacks involved DNS amplification. The largest attack spanned 711 MBit/s from 330 amplifiers and lasted for three hours. The shortest attack lasted for 39 sec. with a bandwidth of 212 MBit/s. Interestingly, attackers already abuse further protocols. We found four CharGen-based attacks that involved up to 3065 amplifiers. Against victims C and G, we observed attacks abusing both, DNS and CharGen simultaneously. Victim F was first targeted with a low-volume CharGen-based attack, until the attackers switched to DNS and achieved almost 1 Gb/s attack capacity. We verified our findings by discussing them with the ISP's CERT. All the DNS-based attack victims were known to the CERT due to basic alerting systems in their networks and the attacks could be confirmed. Three of the CharGen-based attacks could be confirmed by correlating the victim's IP address with the target of preceding DNS-based attacks. The fourth CharGen-based attack, although relatively small in bandwidth, severely interfered with a DSL-connected customer. The CERT was not aware of any DRDoS attack that we did not detect, indicating a low false negative rate. However, the CERT had been affected by SNMP-based amplification attacks outside of the timespan that we monitored. This shows that attackers already abuse some of the protocols which we found to be prone to DRDoS abuse.
D. Real-world Amplifier Abuse
Next, we aim to identify legitimate services that are abused as amplifiers during a DRDoS attack. Our goal is thus not to identify the DRDoS victim (as in Section IV-C), but to detect the amplification abuse itself as a first step towards service hardening and egress filtering.
Detecting the abuse of amplifiers is significantly more difficult than identifying DRDoS victims. The ratio between in-and outgoing bytes of victims was quite distinctive in the previous context. With amplifiers, a few complications are added to the detection. First, amplifiers act as servers and are thus also used by many other, legitimate clients. Legitimate clients may have the normal demand for highbandwidth communication, thus (again) the bandwidth alone is not a good indicator for abuse. Second, as opposed to DRDoS victims, amplifiers always have both, incoming and outgoing traffic within a client/server pair. Nevertheless, we can re-use the technique presented in Section IV-C, but with different filtering thresholds. Based on our insights on average amplification rates from Section III, we chose to flag pairflows with (more than) a fivefold BAF, i.e., we set T r = 5.0. To focus on aggressive attacks and limit the number of false positives, we set the threshold for the minimum number of bytes sent by a potential amplifier to 10 MB, i.e., T B = 10,000,000. We further aim to detect amplifiers within the ISP's network. We thus discard all pairflows with external servers (potential amplifiers), i.e., servers that are outside of the authority of the ISP (and its customers). In favor of fewer alerts for manual inspection, we also discard pairflows with an average bandwidth of less than 10 Kbit/s. This may cause that we miss low-volume attacks, but it helps to filter out the large number of legitimate client/server pairs with low-volume communication.
Results: Our method flagged 143 pairflows in the Netflow dataset as suspicious. We again discussed our insights with the CERT to evaluate our results. We spotted six open recursive DNS resolvers that were abused in 55 DRDoS attacks with BAF between 34-67. In addition, one authoritative name server was abused in three DRDoS attacks. Our methodology also flagged four closed DNS recursive resolvers as suspicious. These servers were mistakenly flagged as amplifiers as they tried to resolve domains from authoritative name servers (all of which at mail.ru) that faced packet loss and thus rarely responded to requests. In these cases, the number of packets and therefore the volume sent was much larger than the volume of the received responses.
Next to DNS, we identified four CharGen servers that were abused to attack 57 victims. The amplification factors varied per CharGen server from 318 to 1395 and was determined by the length of the response string by the server. We also found five SNMP-enabled devices that showed suspicious behavior. In two separate time spans, one 55 min, another 1:20h, these devices were abused for simultaneous low-volume attacks with 35 Kbit/s each. Lastly, we found alerts for potential abuses of three Steam game servers. Unfortunately, we could not verify these alerts, as the servers had already been taken offline when we manually investigated them.
In a different experiment, we inspected the traffic recorded at our amplifier baits. We observed one case where our CharGen server was abused as DRDoS amplifier. The attack started just 14 minutes after the server was first discovered by a host -showing how fast attackers act from identifying amplifiers to abusing them. In seven further incidents, we found that our Quake 3 game server was abused, in all cases exactly in the way we describe the attack in Section III. None of the baits in the P2P networks, neither the benign networks nor the malicious botnets, were abused in DRDoS attacks. We had to ignore eight alerts that were caused by UDP-based and session-aware file downloads, though, which legitimately have high amplification factors.
Overall, we have identified dozens of real-world amplification DRDoS attacks, showing that amplification vulnerabilities are indeed a problem. Attackers are already exploiting the amplification potential of game server protocols, CharGen, DNS and SNMP, and will likely explore further protocol vulnerabilities in the future.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
We have shown that DRDoS attacks pose a problem to network administrators, ISPs or even Internet Exchange Points, which is also documented by past attacks [16, 15, 36] . In this section, we therefore discuss proactive and reactive countermeasures against DRDoS attacks.
A. Preventing IP Address Spoofing
The root cause of amplification attacks is that an attacker can force amplifiers to reflect responses to victims by spoofing the source IP address. If spoofing was not possible, our threat model and hence all attacks would be mitigated. Lots of effort has thus been spent on disabling IP source address spoofing. For example, Ferguson and Senie suggest to drop all packets that do not have IP source addresses an exit router is responsible for [21] . Many providers acted and prevent spoofing nowadays so that attackers cannot abuse their networks for amplification attacks.
Unfortunately, still a significant number of providers allow IP address spoofing. The Spoofer Project, to our knowledge the best public resource for measures of such kind, stated in August 2013 that 24.6% of the Autonomous Systems fully allow and further 13.9% at least partially allow IP address spoofing [1] . Geographical tests show that the networks that support spoofing are distributed worldwide, i.e., we do not face a regional problem. While we advocate to ban IP spoofing, it remains unclear if at some point all networks will mitigate IP address spoofing.
B. Protocol Hardening
Despite IP address spoofing, we found that many protocols were designed without considering the security implications of DRDoS attacks. In this section, we will discuss complementary ways to harden protocols against amplification abuse.
1) Session Handling:
One of the core issues we identified is that amplification attacks are possible if UDP-based protocols do not require sessions. For example, the threeway handshake in TCP would not complete for spoofed IP addresses and thus effectively mitigates our threat model. A possible solution for the vulnerable UDP-based protocols is thus to include similar session handling.
In fact, a few more recent protocols already include session handling. For example, the QUIC protocol, an UDP-based version of Google's SPDY protocol, assigns a source address token to the client. The token is an authenticated-encryption block that contains the client's IP address and a timestamp. Receipt and successful retransmission of the token by the client is taken as proof of ownership of the IP. Similarly, in some BitTorrent tracker implementations, the servers compute a "connection ID" and send it to the client. Only if the client retransmit this ID in future requests the tracker will respond. In Steam, clients have to request a 4-byte-wide challenge before they can request more elaborate server information, such as the list of players. In DTLS, a UDP-based variant of TLS, the server can issue stateless cookies to a client, which a client must include in follow-up communication. The server proceeds communication only if it can verify the cookie.
Session handling prevents amplification attacks only if all request types vulnerable to amplification demand prior session instantiation. For example, in the Steam protocol, we found a BAF of 14.7 for the request types that do not require prior session agreement. The other downside of sessions is that they decrease the efficiency of protocols. First, establishing a session may add latency to the initial communication. Second, the client needs to prove its session within each request, adding extra bytes to each request.
Lastly, it is tricky -if not impossible -to add session handling to existing protocols without breaking compatibility with legacy clients. Session handling typically needs to be included during a protocol's design phase and before the protocol is deployed. A possible solution for protocols that use UDP and TCP (such as DNS) is switching to TCP mode if responses exceed a size threshold.
2) Request/Response Symmetry: An alternative strategy to reduce the amplification rate is demanding that requests are similarly large as the expected responses. A server that receives a request that is "too small" will not, or only partially, respond to the request, without the need of any session handling. Protocols hardened in such a way are not vulnerable for amplification attacks, which causes that many of the existing protocols cannot be abused by attackers. The downside is that the efficiency of the protocol drops and the clients/servers face higher loads even in the benign use case.
3) Rate Limiting: Another strategy to harden a protocol is to limit the number of requests a client may issue. In fact, a few protocol implementations already deploy rate limiting. For example, a Reponse Rate Limiting feature is currently integrated into popular DNS name servers [38] . Administrators can configure DNS servers such that they limit the number of responses per subnet in a given time interval, falling back to truncated messages if the limit is exceeded. Recent Quake 3 server implementations only respond with a single status report per requesting IP address and second. Kad implementations like eMule count the client requests and blacklist peers that send too many requests. And even in malicious networks like the Gameover botnet rate limiting is in place -IP addresses are permanently blacklisted if they issue more than ten requests per minute [2] .
Rate limiting helps to protect against excessive abuse of a single amplifier. However, an attacker may choose to abuse an amplifier at a low request rate, such as one request per second. A single amplifier does not exhibit large amounts of traffic in such an attack. Combining millions of amplifiers results in high accumulated attack bandwidths, though. We therefore seek to understand how powerful amplification attacks can be even in presence of rate limiting. To analyze the effects of rate limiting, we assume for a gedanken experiment that all protocols rate limited the requests, e.g., to one request per source IP address and second. We can then multiply the number of amplifiers with the length of the response to calculate the aggregated attack potential. Table VI summarizes the total bandwidth an attacker could still gain in such a setting (column /32). For protocols with small numbers of amplifiers, such as in DNS NS , rate limiting can indeed limit the harm of attacks to less than 100 Mbit/s. However, for six other services, the aggregated attack bandwidth is still in the Gb/s range.
Worse, attackers can evade host-based rate limiting to some extent by spoofing multiple IP addresses from a victim's network. This is possible, for example, if adversaries attack a network instead of a single host. We thus also compute the bandwidths a victim with an attack surface of a /24 network would face. With as few as 256 hosts in a network, rate limiting fails to prevent larger attacks and allows attacks from 32.9 Gb/s to 22.2 Tb/s for nine protocols. We thus advocate to perform rate limiting on a per-subnet basis instead of a per-host basis.
Finally, badly-designed rate limiting implementations may allow for dangerous DoS attacks against the protocol itself. For example, an attacker could aim to exhaust the rate of a DNS resolver at authoritative name servers to prevent it from resolving domains. Luckily, the DNS-based rate limiting initiative has countered this by falling back to truncating or TCP. Similarly, an attacker can prevent a player from retrieving game server status information by exhausting the allowed rate for the player's IP address. We leave an evaluation of similar attacks open to future work.
C. Secure Service Configuration
Many protocols can be hardened against amplification by fixing weak parts in the service configurations. For example, configuring a DNS name server that offers recursive name resolution to the public is considered bad practice. To secure their servers, administrators can restrict the authorized clients to the users in their network and discard requests from all other address ranges. Moreover, authenticating clients would help to protect other services. For example, most of the SNMP-enabled devices are exposed to the Internet and use the default community without password protection -configuring a password mitigates abuse.
The reasons for insecure server configurations are manifold. A major issue are services that are simply enabled with insecure default configurations. For example, vendors often ship devices with configurations that are vulnerable to amplification attacks, such as network-enabled printers or consumer routers. In a few cases, a poorly designed protocol (or one of the protocol's features) allows attacks and changing configurations does not help -such as in the cases of the legacy protocols QOTD and CharGen.
D. Packet-based Filtering
Reactive countermeasures will help as a last resort against DRDoS attacks. Defenders, such as upstream providers, can typically deploy packet-based filtering techniques to block attack traffic. We asked a CERT about the features their anti-DDoS appliances offer for packet-based filtering. We understood that they typically use four packet-based filtering techniques to mitigate DRDoS attacks: filters by (i) IP addresses, (ii) UDP and TCP ports, (iii) packet lengths, or (iv) by payload string matching.
We seek to understand to what extent DRDoS attacks abusing the 14 protocols can be detected by such packetbased filters. The distributed nature of DRDoS attacks evades IP address filters. We thus analyze if the protocols have characteristic behavior that matches any of the latter three packet-based filtering features. We proceed as follows for each protocol. For (ii), we measure the number of UDP ports amplifiers use to reply to our requests, and compute what ratio of the amplifiers answered with the most popular UDP port (the statistical mode). For (iii), we proceed likewise for the response lengths. For (iv), we search for static substrings in all responses which can be used for payload matching. We explicitly do not analyze false positives of packet-based filtering approaches. These approaches are crude (but helpful) methods to separate attacking protocols from other protocols and are often the only alternative to null-routing DRDoS victims.
Table VII summarizes our results. For the second and third major column, we list first the number of unique ports/lengths and then the ratio of ports/lengths matching the statistical mode.
11 The fourth major column shows the number of bytes we found to be static in all replies (at a fixed offset). The '+' indicates that further payload bytes are fixed, but at varying packet offsets. For example, we observed NetBios responses from six different source ports that all share at least seven payload bytes -a vast majority (97.9%) of these packets are sent using the standard source port, though. Table VII shows that we can use the source port to match over 95% of the packets for seven protocols. Although not a clear attack indicator, it gives a first opportunity to filter on other attack criteria, such as content filters. Length-based filtering looks ineffective for most protocols, but matches 98% of the packets of the ZeroAccess botnet 12 . Lastly, 10 of the 14 protocols have a static substring of at least seven bytes, allowing for payload-based detection. Having said this, these packet-based detection mechanisms do not necessarily help to detection attack traffic. Instead, they can typically only pre-select candidates for attack traffic based on typical characteristics per protocol -distinguishing legitimate from malicious traffic remains tricky.
A few services stand out of the set, as they do not offer any known way for detecting attack traffic. For example, 11 We accidentally did not record the source ports in the experiments for DNS NS and thus had to omit their analysis. 12 In fact, ZAv2 spans four separate botnets each running one port. In this special case, we used these four ports as a mode.
the Kad responses can only be identified by matching two bytes of payload -source ports are chosen at random and responses vary in length. In fact, an attacker abusing Kad can influence the response length by varying the number of peers he requests during a peer exchange. Worse, for two botnets, the responses are encrypted in such a way that the payloads lack characteristic substrings, source ports are chosen at random, and responses are padded with a random number of bytes. This leaves defenders little chance to identify these protocols on a per-packet basis.
VI. RELATED WORK
This section describes the related work in the are of DRDoS attacks. Specht/Lee [30] and Mirkovic/Reiher [18] gave a general overview and proposed a taxonomy of DDoS attacks. We will discuss more specific related research in the following subsections grouped by topic.
A. DDoS Attack Types
An alternative way to launch powerful DDoS attacks are networks of remotely-controllable bots that are abused to craft DDoS attacks. Büscher and Holz analyze DirtJumper, a botnet family with the specific task to perform DDoS attacks by abusing the Internet connection of infected PCs [4] . The DirtJumper botnet attacks at the application-level layer and does not aim to exhaust bandwidth, though. Kang et al. propose the Crossfire attack, in which bots direct low-intensity flows to a large number of publicly accessible servers [12] . These flows are concentrated on carefully chosen links such that they flood these links and disconnect target servers from the Internet. Studer and Perrig describe the Coremelt attack, in which bots send legitimate traffic to each other to flood and disable a network link between them [32] . All these attacks rely on bots, while our threat model only assumes that an attacker has any spoofing-enabled Internet uplink. Although the DRDoS attacks primarily try to congest bandwidth of a single victim, they can possibly be combined with the aforementioned techniques.
Naoumov and Ross analyze if P2P systems can be abused for DDoS attacks by aggressively advertizing a victim in the Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [20] . They manipulate the Overnet P2P network and show that a potential victim will receive undesired TCP connections and UDP packets once it is well-known among the peers. Experiments have shown that this attack adds two Mbit/s bandwidth and 350 simultaneous TCP connections to victims -clearly falling behind the abuse potential we have identified for P2P networks. Sia [29] and El Defrawy et al. [7] describe similar attacks poisoning the BitTorrent DHT with equally low DDoS attack volumes. Sun et al. found that a similar attack on Kad DHT allows an attacker for bandwidth amplification of up to factor 8 [33] . Further stateful attacks have been evaluated by Sun et al. [34, 35] even for gossip-based P2P networks that do not have a DHT. However, stateful attacks require peer membership poisoning, which is impractical for attackers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the amplification vulnerabilities in P2P protocols that can be abused for DRDoS attacks. In contrast to attacks that manipulate P2P membership information, we described stateless attacks. Stateless attacks can be launched and stopped without delay in bootstrapping or shutdown, which attackers may abuse for attacks that require fast reaction times (such as extortion attacks).
Closest to our work, Paxson analyzed the possibility for DRDoS attacks in 2001 [24] . Paxson's threat model is reflection in general, including the abuse of (non-to little-amplified) protocols such as ICMP and TCP. He also mentions two UDPbased protocols, DNS and SNMP, as possible amplification vectors. We have discovered amplification vectors that evade nowadays' detection methods and discovered 12 further UDPbased protocols that are also vulnerable to amplification attacks. In addition, we demonstrate and measure the threat of amplification attacks, for which only anecdotal evidence existed until now.
B. DDoS Detection and Mitigation
Another field of research investigated techniques how to detect and mitigate DDoS attack. Ioannidis and Bellovin proposed Pushback [10] , in which upstream routers collaborate to drop undesired packets. Wang et al. propose to counter bandwidth-congestion attacks by forcing senders to solve small computational puzzles [39] . Sekar et al. propose LADS, a Netflow and SNMP-driven system to detect anomalies of DDoS traffic [28] . A few traffic analysis features in LADS are similar to our method in Section V-D, although we tailored our approach to DRDoS attacks.
Kreibich et al. introduce the notion of packet asymmetry to detect unsolicited traffic [13] . Rather than comparing bytes, they chose to compare packet counters to capture the implicit signaling of legitimate communication. Our proposal is based on traffic volume asymmetries and can thus also detect protocol abuses in which only the bandwidth (but not the number of packets) is amplified. We have shown in Table III that -in the context of detecting DRDoS attacks -bandwidth asymmetries can be used to detect more protocols (such as CharGen, QOTD, SNMP or NetBios) than monitoring packet asymmetries.
Prior research also addressed the problem of identifying IP spoofing. For example, Eto et al. propose a statistical method to identify IP address spoofing by correlating the TTL field in the IP header with the actual hop count that a packet originating from this source should have taken [9] . Yaar et al. propose to detect DDoS traffic by tracing back the routes IP packets have taken [41] . Extending this work, Perrig et al. propose StackPi, a system to deterministically mark packets at routers to allow filtering of packets with untrustworthy routes at the recipient [25] . These approaches are complementary to our research and may help to detect the abuse of amplifiersthey cannot help to defend against DRDoS attacks from the victim's perspective, though.
Another line of research aims to detect scanning activities. Jung et al. propose Threshold Random Walk, an online detection algorithm to detect malicious port scans [11] . Sridharan proposes TAPS, which uses sequential hypothesis testing to detect hosts that exhibit abnormal access patterns in terms of destination hosts and ports [31] . Paredes-Oliva et al. compare these two portscan detection techniques and evaluate their performance in flow-and packet-based Netflow sampling settings [23] . We seek for horizontal scans in a fourweek-long dataset for a post-mortem analysis and thus use a counting-based approach to detect scans for amplifiers.
C. DDoS Attack Analysis
Lastly, related work covers the analysis of DDoS attacks. Bailey et al. describe how darknets can help to identify scanning activities or backscatter of DoS attacks [3] . Whyte et al. propose to extend darknets by darkports, i.e., monitoring unused ports at a system to detect scanning activities [40] . Moore et al. use backscatter data to analyze tens of thousands of DoS attacks against a /8 network [19] . While showing the significance of the threat of DoS in general, they do not analyze DRDoS attacks in specific.
Mao et al. correlate real-world DDoS attacks found in Netflow data from a tier-1 ISP with attacks found via backscatter analysis in darknets [17] . They highlight that backscatter analysis reveals only limited insights into DDoS attacks. This supports our hypothesis that attacks where an attacker uses IP spoofing to directly attack a victim are practically irrelevant. Instead, only the amplifiers receive spoofed IP packets, while the victims receive non-spoofed responses from the amplifiers.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
By disclosing 14 vulnerable protocols we may motivate adversaries to mimic our attacks. Until now, we have not yet experienced DRDoS attacks with amplification rates as in NTP, where an attacker can use, e.g., a 1 Gb/s uplink to severalTbit/s-large attacks. Publicly discussing these vulnerabilities may change this picture in the feature. We therefore follow the principles of responsible disclosure and alerted both, the security community (e.g., CERTs) as well as software developers of the most severely affected deployments (whenever possible). We are in the process of delivering lists of amplifiers to data clearing houses like shadowserver.org to foster alerts. Furthermore, we currently implement a live-traffic detection tool of the methods mentioned in Section IV and plan to release it to the community soon. It is unlikely that all of the vulnerable services will be hardened at some point, but we can work towards gradual improvements with these steps.
The reasons for the amplification vectors are manifold. Some of the protocols (e.g., CharGen and QOTD) have been designed in the 1980's without security in mind. Today, the legacy protocols have no real use anymore. In other cases, specific implementations of a protocol introduce angles for amplification. For example, public debugging functionality (like the monlist feature in NTP) is not officially in the protocol descriptions but added for convenience. Developers of gaming protocols or P2P protocols try to reduce the upstream traffic, as many end-users have accounts with asynchronous line speeds (i.e., higher download than upload bandwidth) [14] -resulting in possible amplification. Lastly, due to the hidden nature of P2P botnets, botmaster did not need to harden their protocols against DRDoS abuse so far and are rather concerned about protecting against takedown efforts [26] .
It remains a tedious effort to design protocols that are hardened against amplification or even simple reflection. Unfortunately, we cannot claim that our list of 14 vulnerable protocols is exhaustive. In future work, we plan to automate the identification of vulnerable protocols. For example, as a starting point, one could use our methods proposed in Section IV to analyze suspicious client/server sessions with more relaxed filtering rules. This would help to leapfrog attackers in identifying further amplification vectors.
Lastly, we left the inspection of TCP-or IP-based (instead of UDP-based) protocols for future work. Likewise, we plan to expand our experiments to IPv6, as we have found quite a few amplifiers in the IPv6 address space. IPv6 may soon become attractive to attackers, for example, because (older) filtering techniques cannot yet cope with IPv6 traffic. In addition, the IPv6 packet header is significantly larger than in IPv4, offering potential for further amplification. We plan to model these attacks in real-time DDoS attack evaluations systems like Reval [37] in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have conceptually and practically demonstrated that at least 14 UDP-based network protocols or service implementations are susceptible to amplification abuse. This shows that there is an urgent need to harden the protocols/implementations at least of the most severely affected services, such as DNS, NTP, SSDP or Kad. Network administrators should be prepared for DRDoS attacks that are at least a magnitude worse from what we have observed so far. We have shown, though, how amplification vulnerabilities can be effectively avoided. With our findings, we hope to start a gradual -but years-long -process of fixing the discovered protocol weaknesses. Our attack analysis and the proposed detection methods/tools support by detecting hosts under attack and identifying amplifiers that are abused.
